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France under de Gaulle. There is an interesting discussion of the possibility
that the Soviet elite may be able to utilize social science for manipulating its
"masses." However, as Ralph K. White recently indicated in the Public
Opinion Quarterly,1' social science is for the totalitarian state a potentially dis-
turbing as well as useful instrument.
Although it often embellishes the obvious, this study even more often forces
the reader to re-examine familiar assumptions. In particular it should shake
American complacency. It is to be hoped that it will be widely read, for it is
a solid, a challenging, and in some ways a distinguished book. No conscientious
reader will emerge from it without re-examining many of his conceptions and
prejudices about the two major political systems. By raising the somewhat
artificial issue of convergence versus evolution the book may promise more
than it - or perhaps any other book - can deliver in the present state of
our knowledge; still it is one of the most substantial contributions to the study
of comparative politics to appear for some time. It will play a useful part in
the current effort being made by some scholars to lift comparative politics
above the level of a rather sterile taxonomy. Works such as this can do much
to overcome the parochialism which still to some degree plagues the study of
comparative and international politics. Also, continued efforts of this kind
can function to focus attention upon important issues, thus contributing, if
not necessarily to consensus, at least to improvement in the quality of debate
and discussion of public policy.
FREDERIcK C. BARGHOORNl
A REASONABLE DOUBT. By Jacob W. Ehrlich. Cleveland: World Publishing
Co., 1964. Pp. 297. $4.95.
J. W. EHRLiCI is not only a famous trial lawyer 1 and the model for tele-
vision's Sam Benedict series, he is also a prolific writer. A Reasonable Doubt
is his tenth publication. Although earlier writings reflect an astonishing breadth
of subject-matter - ranging from the jury system to the Bible to the rather
possessively entitled Ehrlich's Blackstone, Ehrlich's Criminal Law, and Ehr-
11. White, Social Science Research in the Soviet Bloc, 28 Pun. OpiN. Q. 20 (1964).
tProfessor of Political Science, Yale University.
1. As of April, 1955, Ehrlich bad tried a total of fifty-five murder cases; of these,
forty-one resulted in outright acquittals, tvelve in manslaughter convictions only, and
two in second-degree murder verdicts. Ehrlich's cases have involved such celebrities as
Billie Holiday, Sallie Rand, Gene Krupa, and Howard Hughes. More recently, Ehrlich
has defended "beat" publisher, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, who was indicted for selling the
allegedly pornographic Howl and Other Poens, by Allen Ginsberg. An account of the
trial is contained in Ehrlich, Howl of the Censor (1961).
Over nine years have passed since the publication of Ehrlich's biography: Noble &
Averbuch, Never Plead Guilty (1955). The biography casts Ehrlich as a hero larger
than life.
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lich's Criminal Evidence - the latest contribution, A Reasonable Doubt, is
perhaps the most ambitious of the lot.2
In form the book consists of a large number of disconnected discussions of
legal rules and practices, coupled with some more or less lively and/or pro-
found anecdotes. At times the author also roams the domains of psychology,
sociology, philosophy, and political science. The subjects discussed include
the Polygraph, Juvenile Delinquency, Organized Crime, Mr. Justice Holmes,
States' Rights, Poverty, the Emancipation Proclamation, and Honesty. Lin-
coln, Tennyson, and the Bible are quoted at length. The book is precisely
characterized in a rather glowing forward as "as much a statement of per-
sonal philosophy as it is a statement of law."' 3 Only parts of this personal
philosophy will be discussed here.
In one of the shorter sections of the book Ehrlich savagely attacks Mr. Justice
Holmes. Of course, taking pot-shots at great jurists is a time-honored tra-
dition of both lawyer and law student - and no judge is immune from criti-
cism - but Ehrlich's comments on Justice Holmes go beyond the tradi-
tional targets of the sharpshooter. It is one thing to argue that Holmes wrote
a bad opinion - which Ehrlich does rather persuasively; it is another to con-
clude from this solitary example that Holmes was a "lawyer only by suffer-
ance," and a "man born to cut bait while the braver did all the fishing."4 What
especially seems to gripe Ehrlich is that Justice Holmes was not a "liberal."
Ehrlich proclaims: "Mr. Justice Holmes has always been thought of as a kind
of . . . liberal."r5 Which isn't true. It has become almost commonplace
to observe that Holmes wasn't really very wedded to the tenets of liberal
democracy. Most recently, Harold Lasswell has noted Holmes' "distaste for
democracy" and his opposition "to a conception of morality and legality that
would hamper the strong for the benefit of the weak."6 But while Professor
Lasswell and others 7 would agree that Holmes' philosophy cannot be pack-
aged neatly to fit many conceptions of liberalism, certainly they would stop
short of labeling him, as trial lawyer Ehrlich does, a "reactionary."
2. Of course, trial lawyers, particularly famous ones, have rarely qualified as shrink-
ig violets. Professor Bishop, reviewing Louis Nizer's My Life in Court, observed that
"hero-worship, amounting to uncritical adulation, is what Mr. Nizer plainly feels for
the subject of his autobiography." Bishop, Book Review, 72 YALE LJ. 614 (1963). But
if the self-inflated ego is a classic subject for wit, it is also, in the case of the trial lawyer,
the source of daring innovation. And it is boldness and originality which seem to charac-
terize the great defense attorneys.
3. White, "Forward," p. 11.
4. Pp. 63-64.
5. P. 60.
6. Lasswell, Book Review, 73 YALE L.J. 532, 535 (1964).
7. See, e.g., KONEFSKY, THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS 11-20 (Collier ed,
1961) ; HowE, JuslicE OLIVER WENDEL HomiMEs: THaE PROVING YEARs (1963) ; Touster,
Holnes: The Years of the Common Law, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 230 (1964); Bickel, The
Battle Over Brandeis, New Republic, Aug. 8, 1964, p. 25.
8. P. 60. And very few would agree with Ehrlich's accusation that "had Holmes
had his way, we would be living in a police state more cruel and vicious than any of
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But if Ehrlich is something less than a major contributor to the literature
of judicial biography, he remains pre-eminently qualified to lecture on the
guides to juror selection. Somewhat surprisingly, in this section titled "A
Dozen Isn't Always Eggs," Ehrlich has little to offer that is novel or even
controversial. 9 Most of the aging cliches are marched out - sometimes a bit
more recklessly than is customary. For example, Ehrlich not only echoes
the common belief among criminal lawyers that members of minority groups
tend to favor the defense, he also characterizes Englishmen, Germans, and
Scandinavians as tending to "believe in absolute law enforcement and severe
punishment for anyone who runs afoul of the law." "Such persons," Ehrlich
asserts, "are ultraconservative, bull-headed, and usually have their minds
made up - in favor of the prosecution - at the outset of the trial."'1 More
flexible, according to Ehrlich, is the "outdoor or athletic type." He can "take
either side" but "if you can convince him, he will espouse your cause till hell
freezes over.""' Perhaps Ehrlich's most original contribution is the notion
that "a Southerner is often a good juror if the client is a Negro, because the
Southerner will often best understand the Negro's problems.'
1 2
Ehrlich cautions, however, that his rules (regarding members of minority
groups, Englishmen, Scandinavians, Germans, outdoor types, and Southern-
ers) are general guidelines only; there is always the fearful possibility of
meeting up with an American of German descent, reared in Mississippi, who
loves to play tennis and take long hikes.
"One hard-and-fast rule," however, is offered up: "Never accept a wealthy
person if the client is poor, nor a poor person if the client is wealthy. The
gap between client and juror cannot be bridged and if you choose a wealthy
juror who reads liberal periodicals you will still be gambling heavily."' 3 This
"hard-and-fast rule," with its not very implicit premise of class conflict, is
probably in accord with general thinking, and may well have accurately de-
scribed the attitudes prevailing twenty years ago.14 Now, however, there is
evidence that the rule does not hold true for many lower income families.
Professor Lane's depth interviews with fifteen "common men" suggest that
us can imagine." P. 19. No more defensible is Ehrlich's statement that Holmes "did more
to undermine and lay waste to our precious Bill of Rights than any other judge il ouir
history." P. 61.
9. SHADOAN (ED.), LAW AND TACTICS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 264-66 (1964),
contains some provocative suggestions for juror selection in insanity cases. A sophisti-
cated model voir dire examination, both for general purposes and insanity cases, is now
available in the excellent BELLOW & SHADOAN: CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE TRIAL





14. Cf. MERTON, MASS PERSUASION: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF A WAR BOND
DRIVE (1946). Merton suggests that the wealthy are perceived as leading immoral lives
and as having achieved their money illegitimately.
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today there is very little hostility toward the "rich ;" rather the view is "that
this is a land of opportunity in which merit will find a way," a view which
leads to acceptance of the status differences in society.15 Rich or poor, "people
deserve their status."'1 Not only are Lane's subjects not hostile toward the
upper classes, but they tend to identify with an to admire them. And equally
important to the trial lawyer, they tend to denigrate those lower in the socio-
economic scale, to consider them lazy, and to hold them somehow responsible
for their impoverished position. 17 Lane's data thus suggest at least two rules-
of-thumb, both of which run counter to Ehrlich's imperative. First, if the de-
fendant is well-to-do, a low status juror is likely to be more lenient than some-
body from the upper strata. And secondly, if the defendant is of a lower
class, a juror with high socio-economic status will be more sympathetic, and
a juror of only slightly higher status than the defendant will be harsher than
somebody from the defendant's own stratum.
Of course, these propositions need further refining, and Lane's study is
exploratory, not conclusive. The real demand is for empirical studies focusing
specifically on the jury process.' 8 In their absence, it is unfair to criticize Ehr-
lich for not being more sophisticated and systematic. The method of all in
the business of selecting jurors is more intuitive than empirical. Ehrlich's
intuition seems no worse than most; it may be better.
15. Lane, Political Ideology 68 (1962).
The greater the strain on a person's self-esteem implied by a relatively low status
in an open society, the greater the necessity to explain this status as "natural"
and "proper" in the social order. Lower-status people generally find it less punish-
ing to think of themselves as correctly placed by a just society than to think of
themselves as exploited or victimized by an unjust society.
Id. at 79.
16. Id. at 68.
17. Id. at 79. Cf. Greenblum & Pearlin, Vertical Mobility and Prejudice: A Socio-
Psychological Analysis, in CLASS, STATUS AND POWER 480 (Bendix & Lipset ed. 1953) ;
HAVIGHURST & NEUGARTEN, SOCIETY AND EDucATi N 371-72 (1957); Kaplan, Segrega-
tion Litigation and the Schools - Part III: The Gary Litigation, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 121,
153-54 (1964).
18. When the full findings of the University of Chicago Jury Project are published,
a long step toward satisfying this demand will have been taken. See TocH (ED.), LEGAL
AND CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY 100-05 (1961), for a succinct survey of the studies on ex-
perimental and actual juries.
Using psychoanalytic concepts, it is possible to make accurate predictions about the
orientation of a prospective juror in a criminal case. For example, it is now well known
that individuals have highly differentiated needs to punish and to be punished, and that
the failure of the state to punish an offender will threaten one individual far more than
another. See ALEXANDER & STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PuBLic 214-15
(rev. ed. 1956). See also, Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of the Insanity Plea - Clues
to the Problems of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity in the Death Cell, 73 YALE L.J.
425 (1964). However, it i plainly impractical at this time to employ psychoanalytic
concepts to the process of juror selection. The need is for more sophisticated application
of broader, sociological categories such as class, occupation, religion, party, age, sex. The
use of these variables is economical; only the knowledge of their relationships to jury
behavior is lacking.
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In summary, the best sections of the book are those in which Ehrlich frankly
assumes the role of the trial lawyer. His advocacy of legalized abortion and
his defense of some poems by Allen Ginsberg (an actual excerpt from oral
argument) reveal him as a skilled debater, who, if not always original or
systematic in presentation, does provide a passionate, sharply-sketched appeal
for justice as he defines it. The weakest sections are those featuring Ehrlich
as a social engineer. Like the losing gambler who frantically keeps switching
the game, the reader skims these sections - on poverty, narcotics, delinquency
hoping vainly for a change in luck.
It was said of Hemingway that the act of writing performed two functions
for him: "It was his weapon against an alien universe - the means by
which he kept himself alive; and it was the battlefield in which he struggled
for a small piece of immortality."'19 Ehrlich's universe is not so much an alien
as an apathetic one, in which he assumes the role of an impatient school-
master. And, as for that "small piece of immortality," it must be concluded
that A Reasonable Doubt reveals Ehrlich rather fully as much the mortal.
GERALD M. CAPLANf
19. RoviT, ERNEST HEIiNGWAY 30 (1963).
tAssistant United States Attorney, District of Columbia.
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